Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication across middleboxes

Internet Draft                                                   B. Ford Document: draft-ford-midcom-p2p-01.txt                            M.I.T. Expires: April 27, 2004                                     P. Srisuresh                                                           Caymas Systems                                                                 D. Kegel                                                                kegel.com                                                             October 2003               Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication across middleboxes Status of this Memo    This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions    of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working documents of    the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its    working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute working    documents as Internet-Drafts.    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at    http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html    Distribution of this document is unlimited. Copyright Notice    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved. Abstract    This memo documents the methods used by the current peer-to-peer    (P2P) applications to communicate in the presence of middleboxes    such as firewalls and network address translators (NAT). In    addition, the memo suggests guidelines to application designers    and middlebox implementers on the measures they could take to    enable immediate, wide deployment of P2P applications with or    without requiring the use of special proxy, relay or midcom    protocols.   Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 1] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003 Table of Contents    1.  Introduction .................................................    2.  Terminology ..................................................    3.  Techniques for P2P communication over middleboxes ............        3.1.  Relaying ...............................................        3.2.  Connection reversal ....................................        3.3.  UDP Hole Punching ......................................              3.3.1.  Peers behind different NATs ..................              3.3.2.  Peers behind the same NAT ....................              3.3.3.  Peers separated by multiple NATs ...............              3.3.4.  Consistent port bindings .......................        3.4.  UDP Port number prediction .............................        3.5.  Simultaneous TCP open ..................................    4.  Application design guidelines ................................        4.1. What works with P2P middleboxes .........................        4.2. Applications behind the same NAT ........................        4.3. Peer discovery ..........................................        4.4. TCP P2P applications ....................................        4.5. Use of midcom protocol ..................................    5.  NAT design guidelines ........................................        5.1. Deprecate the use of symmetric NATs .....................        5.2. Add incremental Cone-NAT support to symmetric NAT devices        5.3. Maintaining consistent port bindings for UDP ports .....              5.3.1.  Preserving Port Numbers ........................        5.4. Maintaining consistent port bindings for TCP ports .....        5.5. Large timeout for P2P applications ......................    6.  Security considerations ...................................... 1. Introduction    Present-day Internet has seen ubiquitous deployment of    "middleboxes" such as network address translators(NAT), driven    primarily by the ongoing depletion of the IPv4 address space.  The    asymmetric addressing and connectivity regimes established by these    middleboxes, however, have created unique problems for peer-to-peer    (P2P) applications and  protocols, such as teleconferencing and    multiplayer on-line gaming. These issues are likely to persist even    into the IPv6 world, where NAT is often used as an IPv4 compatibility    mechanism [NAT-PT], and firewalls will still be commonplace even    after NAT is no longer required.    Currently deployed middleboxes are designed primarily around the    client/server paradigm, in which relatively anonymous client machines    actively initiate connections to well-connected servers having stable    IP addresses and DNS names.  Most middleboxes implement an asymmetric Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 2] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    communication model in which hosts on the private internal network    can initiate outgoing connections to hosts on the public network, but    external hosts cannot initiate connections to internal hosts except    as specifically configured by the middlebox's administrator. In the    common case of NAPT, a client on the internal network does not have    a unique IP address on the public Internet, but instead must share    a single public IP address, managed by the NAPT, with other hosts    on the same private network.  The anonymity and inaccessibility of    the internal hosts behind a middlebox is not a problem for client    software such as web browsers, which only need to initiate outgoing    connections. This inaccessibility is sometimes seen as a privacy    benefit.    In the peer-to-peer paradigm, however, Internet hosts that would    normally be considered "clients" need to establish communication    sessions directly with each other. The initiator and the responder    might lie behind different middleboxes with neither endpoint    having any permanent IP address or other form of public network    presence. A common on-line gaming architecture, for example,    is for the participating application hosts to contact a well-known    server for initialization and administration purposes. Subsequent    to this, the hosts establish direct connections with each other    for fast and efficient propagation of updates during game play.    Similarly, a file sharing application might contact a well-known    server for resource discovery or searching, but establish direct    connections with peer hosts for data transfer. Middleboxes create    problems for peer-to-peer connections because hosts behind a    middlebox normally have no permanently usable public ports on the    Internet to which incoming TCP or UDP connections from other peers    can be directed.  RFC 3235 [NAT-APPL] briefly addresses this issue,    but does not offer any general solutions.    In this document we address the P2P/middlebox problem in two ways.    First, we summarize known methods by which P2P applications can    work around the presence of middleboxes. Second, we provide a set    of application design guidelines based on these practices to make    P2P applications operate more robustly over currently-deployed    middleboxes. Further, we provide design guidelines for future    middleboxes to allow them to support P2P applications more    effectively. Our focus is to enable immediate and wide deployment    of P2P applications requiring to traverse middleboxes. 2. Terminology In this section we first summarize some middlebox terms. We focus here on the two kinds of middleboxes that commonly cause problems for P2P applications. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 3] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    Firewall       A firewall restricts communication between a private internal       network and the public Internet, typically by dropping packets       that are deemed unauthorized.  A firewall examines but does       not modify the IP address and TCP/UDP port information in       packets crossing the boundary.    Network Address Translator (NAT)       A network address translator not only examines but also modifies       the header information in packets flowing across the boundary,       allowing many hosts behind the NAT to share the use of a smaller       number of public IP addresses (often one).    Network address translators in turn have two main varieties:    Basic NAT       A Basic NAT maps an internal host's private IP address to a       public IP address without changing the TCP/UDP port       numbers in packets crossing the boundary.  Basic NAT is generally       only useful when the NAT has a pool of public IP addresses from       which to make address bindings on behalf of internal hosts.    Network Address/Port Translator (NAPT)       By far the most common, a Network Address/Port Translator examines       and modifies both the IP address and the TCP/UDP port number       fields of packets crossing the boundary, allowing multiple       internal hosts to share a single public IP address simultaneously.    Refer to [NAT-TRAD] and [NAT-TERM] for more general information on    NAT taxonomy and terminology. Additional terms that further classify    NAPT are defined in more recent work [STUN]. When an internal host    opens an outgoing TCP or UDP session through a network address/port    translator, the NAPT assigns the session a public IP address and    port number so that subsequent response packets from the external    endpoint can be received by the NAPT, translated, and forwarded    to the internal host. The effect is that the NAPT establishes a    port binding between (private IP address, private port number) and    (public IP address, public port number). The port binding    defines the address translation the NAPT will perform for the    duration of the session.  An issue of relevance to P2P    applications is how the NAT behaves when an internal host initiates    multiple simultaneous sessions from a single (private IP, private    port) pair to multiple distinct endpoints on the external network.    Cone NAT       After establishing a port binding between a (private IP, private       port) tuple and a (public IP, public port) tuple, a cone NAT will       re-use this port binding for subsequent sessions the Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 4] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003       application may initiate from the same private IP address and       port number, for as long as at least one session using the port       binding remains active.       For example, suppose Client A in the diagram below initiates two       simultaneous outgoing sessions through a cone NAT, from the same       internal endpoint (10.0.0.1:1234) to two different       external servers, S1 and S2.  The cone NAT assigns just one public       endpoint tuple, 155.99.25.11:62000, to both of these sessions,       ensuring that the "identity" of the client's port is maintained       across address translation. Since Basic NATs and firewalls do       not modify port numbers as packets flow across       the middlebox, these types of middleboxes can be viewed as a       degenerate form of Cone NAT.            Server S1                                     Server S2         18.181.0.31:1235                              138.76.29.7:1235                |                                             |                |                                             |                +----------------------+----------------------+                                       |           ^  Session 1 (A-S1)  ^      |      ^  Session 2 (A-S2)  ^           |  18.181.0.31:1235  |      |      |  138.76.29.7:1235  |           v 155.99.25.11:62000 v      |      v 155.99.25.11:62000 v                                       |                                    Cone NAT                                  155.99.25.11                                       |           ^  Session 1 (A-S1)  ^      |      ^  Session 2 (A-S2)  ^           |  18.181.0.31:1235  |      |      |  138.76.29.7:1235  |           v   10.0.0.1:1234    v      |      v   10.0.0.1:1234    v                                       |                                    Client A                                 10.0.0.1:1234 Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 5] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    Symmetric NAT       A symmetric NAT, in contrast, does not maintain a consistent       port binding  between (private IP, private port) and (public IP,       public port) across all sessions. Instead, it assigns a new       public port to each new session.  For example, suppose Client A       initiates two outgoing sessions from the same port as above, one       with S1 and one with S2.  A symmetric NAT might allocate the       public endpoint 155.99.25.11:62000 to session 1, and then allocate       a different public endpoint 155.99.25.11:62001, when the       application initiates session 2.  The NAT is able to differentiate       between the two sessions for translation purposes because the       external endpoints involved in the sessions (those of S1       and S2) differ, even as the endpoint identity of the client       application is lost across the address translation boundary.            Server S1                                     Server S2         18.181.0.31:1235                              138.76.29.7:1235                |                                             |                |                                             |                +----------------------+----------------------+                                       |           ^  Session 1 (A-S1)  ^      |      ^  Session 2 (A-S2)  ^           |  18.181.0.31:1235  |      |      |  138.76.29.7:1235  |           v 155.99.25.11:62000 v      |      v 155.99.25.11:62001 v                                       |                                  Symmetric NAT                                  155.99.25.11                                       |           ^  Session 1 (A-S1)  ^      |      ^  Session 2 (A-S2)  ^           |  18.181.0.31:1235  |      |      |  138.76.29.7:1235  |           v   10.0.0.1:1234    v      |      v   10.0.0.1:1234    v                                       |                                    Client A                                 10.0.0.1:1234    The issue of cone versus symmetric NAT behavior applies equally    to TCP and UDP traffic.    Cone NAT is further classified according to how liberally the NAT    accepts incoming traffic directed to an already-established (public    IP, public port) pair.  This classification generally applies only to    UDP traffic, since NATs and firewalls reject incoming TCP    connection attempts unconditionally unless specifically configured to    do otherwise.    Full Cone NAT Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 6] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003       After establishing a public/private port binding for a new       outgoing session, a full cone NAT will subsequently accept       incoming traffic to the corresponding public port from ANY       external endpoint on the public network.  Full cone NAT is       also sometimes called "promiscuous" NAT.    Restricted Cone NAT       A restricted cone NAT only forwards an incoming packet directed to       a public port if its external (source) IP address matches the       address of a node to which the internal host has previously sent       one or more outgoing packets.  A restricted cone NAT effectively       refines the firewall principle of rejecting unsolicited incoming       traffic, by restricting incoming traffic to a set of "known"       external IP addresses.    Port-Restricted Cone NAT       A port-restricted cone NAT, in turn, only forwards an incoming       packet if its external IP address AND port number match those of       an external endpoint to which the internal host has previously       sent outgoing packets.  A port-restricted cone NAT provides       internal nodes the same level of protection against unsolicited       incoming traffic that a symmetric NAT does, while maintaining a       private port's identity across translation.    Finally, in this document we define new terms for classifying    the P2P-relevant behavior of middleboxes:    P2P-Application       P2P-application as used in this document is an application in       which each P2P participant registers with a public       registration server, and subsequently uses either its       private endpoint, or public endpoint, or both, to establish       peering sessions.    P2P-Middlebox       A P2P-Middlebox is middlebox that permits the traversal of       P2P applications.    P2P-firewall       A P2P-firewall is a P2P-Middlebox that provides firewall       functionality but performs no address translation.    P2P-NAT       A P2P-NAT is a P2P-Middlebox that provides NAT functionality, and       may also provide firewall functionality. At minimum, a       P2P-Middlebox must implement Cone NAT behavior for UDP traffic,       allowing applications to establish robust P2P connectivity using       the UDP hole punching technique. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 7] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    Loopback translation       When a host in the private domain of a NAT device attempts to       connect with another host behind the same NAT device using       the public address of the host, the NAT device performs the       equivalent of a "Twice-nat" translation on the packet as       follows. The originating host's private endpoint is translated       into its assigned public endpoint, and the target host's public       endpoint is translated into its private endpoint, before       the packet is forwarded to the target host. We refer the above       translation performed by a NAT device as "Loopback translation". 3. Techniques for P2P Communication over middleboxes    This section reviews in detail the currently known techniques for    implementing peer-to-peer communication over existing middleboxes,    from the perspective of the application or protocol designer. 3.1. Relaying    The most reliable, but least efficient, method of implementing peer-    to-peer communication in the presence of a middlebox is to make the    peer-to-peer communication look to the network like client/server    communication through relaying.  For example, suppose two client    hosts, A and B, have each initiated TCP or UDP connections with a    well-known server S having a permanent IP address.  The clients    reside on separate private networks, however, and their respective    middleboxes prevent either client from directly initiating a    connection to the other.                                 Server S                                    |                                    |             +----------------------+----------------------+             |                                             |           NAT A                                         NAT B             |                                             |             |                                             |          Client A                                      Client B    Instead of attempting a direct connection, the two clients can simply    use the server S to relay messages between them.  For example, to    send a message to client B, client A simply sends the message to    server S along its already-established client/server connection, and    server S then sends the message on to client B using its existing    client/server connection with B.    This method has the advantage that it will always work as long as Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 8] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    both clients have connectivity to the server.  Its obvious    disadvantages are that it consumes the server's processing power and    network bandwidth unnecessarily, and communication latency between    the two clients is likely to be increased even if the server is well-    connected.  The TURN protocol [TURN] defines a method of implementing    relaying in a relatively secure fashion. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                         [Page 9] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003 3.2. Connection reversal    The second technique works if only one of the clients is behind a    middlebox.  For example, suppose client A is behind a NAT but client    B has a globally routable IP address, as in the following diagram:                                 Server S                             18.181.0.31:1235                                    |                                    |             +----------------------+----------------------+             |                                             |           NAT A                                           |     155.99.25.11:62000                                    |             |                                             |             |                                             |          Client A                                      Client B       10.0.0.1:1234                               138.76.29.7:1234    Client A has private IP address 10.0.0.1, and the application is    using TCP port 1234.  This client has established a connection with    server S at public IP address 18.181.0.31 and port 1235.  NAT A has    assigned TCP port 62000, at its own public IP address 155.99.25.11,    to serve as the temporary public endpoint address for A's session    with S: therefore, server S believes that client A is at IP address    155.99.25.11 using port 62000.  Client B, however, has its own    permanent IP address, 138.76.29.7, and the peer-to-peer application    on B is accepting TCP connections at port 1234.    Now suppose client B would like to initiate a peer-to-peer    communication session with client A.  B might first attempt to    contact client A either at the address client A believes itself to    have, namely 10.0.0.1:1234, or at the address of A as observed by    server S, namely 155.99.25.11:62000.  In either case, however, the    connection will fail.  In the first case, traffic directed to IP    address 10.0.0.1 will simply be dropped by the network because    10.0.0.1 is not a publicly routable IP address.  In the second case,    the TCP SYN request from B will arrive at NAT A directed to port    62000, but NAT A will reject the connection request because only    outgoing connections are allowed.    After attempting and failing to establish a direct connection to A,    client B can use server S to relay a request to client A to initiate    a "reversed" connection to client B.  Client A, upon receiving this    relayed request through S, opens a TCP connection to client B at B's    public IP address and port number.  NAT A allows the connection to    proceed because it is originating inside the firewall, and client B    can receive the connection because it is not behind a middlebox. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 10] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    A variety of current peer-to-peer systems implement this technique.    Its main limitation, of course, is that it only works as long as only    one of the communicating peers is behind a NAT: in the increasingly    common case where both peers are behind NATs, the method fails.      Because connection reversal is not a general solution to the problem,    it is NOT recommended as a primary strategy.  Applications may choose    to attempt connection reversal, but should be able to fall back    automatically on another mechanism such as relaying if neither a    "forward" nor a "reverse" connection can be established. 3.3. UDP hole punching    The third technique, and the one of primary interest in this    document, is widely known as "UDP Hole Punching."  UDP hole punching    relies on the properties of common firewalls and cone NATs to allow    appropriately designed peer-to-peer applications to "punch holes"    through the middlebox and establish direct connectivity with each    other, even when both communicating hosts may lie behind middleboxes.    This technique was mentioned briefly in section 5.1 of RFC 3027 [NAT-    PROT], and has been informally described elsewhere on the Internet    [KEGEL] and used in some recent protocols [TEREDO, ICE].  As the name    implies, unfortunately, this technique works reliably only with UDP.    We will consider two specific scenarios, and how applications can be    designed to handle both of them gracefully.  In the first situation,    representing the common case, two clients desiring direct peer-to-    peer communication reside behind two different NATs.  In the second,    the two clients actually reside behind the same NAT, but do not    necessarily know that they do. 3.3.1. Peers behind different NATs    Suppose clients A and B both have private IP addresses and lie behind    different network address translators.  The peer-to-peer application    running on clients A and B and on server S each use UDP port 1234.  A    and B have each initiated UDP communication sessions with server S,    causing NAT A to assign its own public UDP port 62000 for A's session    with S, and causing NAT B to assign its port 31000 to B's session    with S, respectively.                                 Server S                             18.181.0.31:1234                                    |                                    |             +----------------------+----------------------+             |                                             |           NAT A                                         NAT B Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 11] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003     155.99.25.11:62000                            138.76.29.7:31000             |                                             |             |                                             |          Client A                                      Client B       10.0.0.1:1234                                 10.1.1.3:1234    Now suppose that client A wants to establish a UDP communication    session directly with client B.  If A simply starts sending UDP    messages to B's public address, 138.76.29.7:31000, then NAT B will    typically discard these incoming messages (unless it is a full cone    NAT), because the source address and port number does not match those    of S, with which the original outgoing session was established.    Similarly, if B simply starts sending UDP messages to A's public    address, then NAT A will typically discard these messages.    Suppose A starts sending UDP messages to B's public address, however,    and simultaneously relays a request through server S to B, asking B    to start sending UDP messages to A's public address.  A's outgoing    messages directed to B's public address (138.76.29.7:31000) cause NAT    A to open up a new communication session between A's private address    and B's public address.  At the same time, B's messages to A's public    address (155.99.25.11:62000) cause NAT B to open up a new    communication session between B's private address and A's public    address.  Once the new UDP sessions have been opened up in each    direction, client A and B can communicate with each other directly    without further burden on the "introduction" server S.    The UDP hole punching technique has several useful properties.  Once    a direct peer-to-peer UDP connection has been established between two    clients behind middleboxes, either party on that connection can in    turn take over the role of "introducer" and help the other party    establish peer-to-peer connections with additional peers, minimizing    the load on the initial introduction server S.  The application does    not need to attempt to detect explicitly what kind of middlebox it is    behind, if any [STUN], since the procedure above will establish peer-    to-peer communication channels equally well if either or both clients    do not happen to be behind a middlebox.  The hole punching technique    even works automatically with multiple NATs, where one or both    clients are removed from the public Internet via two or more levels    of address translation. 3.3.2. Peers behind the same NAT    Now consider the scenario in which the two clients (probably    unknowingly) happen to reside behind the same NAT, and are therefore    located in the same private IP address space.  Client A has    established a UDP session with server S, to which the common NAT has    assigned public port number 62000.  Client B has similarly Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 12] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    established a session with S, to which the NAT has assigned public    port number 62001.                                 Server S                             18.181.0.31:1234                                    |                                    |                                   NAT                          A-S 155.99.25.11:62000                          B-S 155.99.25.11:62001                                    |             +----------------------+----------------------+             |                                             |          Client A                                      Client B       10.0.0.1:1234                                 10.1.1.3:1234    Suppose that A and B use the UDP hole punching technique as outlined    above to establish a communication channel using server S as an    introducer.  Then A and B will learn each other's public IP addresses    and port numbers as observed by server S, and start sending each    other messages at those public addresses.  The two clients will be    able to communicate with each other this way as long as the NAT    allows hosts on the internal network to open translated UDP sessions    with other internal hosts and not just with external hosts. We refer    to this situation as "loopback translation," because packets arriving    at the NAT from the private network are translated and then "looped    back" to the private network rather than being passed through to the    public network.  For example, when A sends a UDP packet to B's public    address, the packet initially has a source IP address and port number    of 10.0.0.1:124 and a destination of 155.99.25.11:62001.  The NAT    receives this packet, translates it to have a source of    155.99.25.11:62000 (A's public address) and a destination of    10.1.1.3:1234, and then forwards it on to B.  Even if loopback    translation is supported by the NAT, this translation and forwarding    step is obviously unnecessary in this situation, and is likely to add    latency to the dialog between A and B as well as burdening the NAT.    The solution to this problem is straightforward, however.  When A and    B initially exchange address information through server S, they    should include their own IP addresses and port numbers as "observed"    by themselves, as well as their addresses as observed by S.  The    clients then simultaneously start sending packets to each other at    each of the alternative addresses they know about, and use the first    address that leads to successful communication.  If the two clients    are behind the same NAT, then the packets directed to their private    addresses are likely to arrive first, resulting in a direct    communication channel not involving the NAT.  If the two clients are    behind different NATs, then the packets directed to their private Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 13] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    addresses will fail to reach each other at all, but the clients will    hopefully establish connectivity using their respective public    addresses.  It is important that these packets be authenticated in    some way, however, since in the case of different NATs it is entirely    possible for A's messages directed at B's private address to reach    some other, unrelated node on A's private network, or vice versa. 3.3.3. Peers separated by multiple NATs    In some topologies involving multiple NAT devices, it is not    possible for two clients to establish an "optimal" P2P route between    them without specific knowledge of the topology.  Consider for    example the following situation.                                 Server S                             18.181.0.31:1234                                    |                                    |                                  NAT X                          A-S 155.99.25.11:62000                          B-S 155.99.25.11:62001                                    |                                    |             +----------------------+----------------------+             |                                             |           NAT A                                         NAT B     192.168.1.1:30000                             192.168.1.2:31000             |                                             |             |                                             |          Client A                                      Client B       10.0.0.1:1234                                 10.1.1.3:1234    Suppose NAT X is a large industrial NAT deployed by an internet    service provider (ISP) to multiplex many customers onto a few public    IP addresses, and NATs A and B are small consumer NAT gateways    deployed independently by two of the ISP's customers to multiplex    their private home networks onto their respective ISP-provided IP    addresses.  Only server S and NAT X have globally routable IP    addresses; the "public" IP addresses used by NAT A and NAT B are    actually private to the ISP's addressing realm, while client A's and    B's addresses in turn are private to the addressing realms of NAT A    and B, respectively.  Each client initiates an outgoing connection to    server S as before, causing NATs A and B each to create a single    public/private translation, and causing NAT X to establish a    public/private translation for each session.    Now suppose clients A and B attempt to establish a direct peer-to- Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 14] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    peer UDP connection.  The optimal method would be for client A to    send messages to client B's public address at NAT B,    192.168.1.2:31000 in the ISP's addressing realm, and for client B to    send messages to A's public address at NAT B, namely    192.168.1.1:30000.  Unfortunately, A and B have no way to learn these    addresses, because server S only sees the "global" public addresses    of the clients, 155.99.25.11:62000 and 155.99.25.11:62001.  Even if A    and B had some way to learn these addresses, there is still no    guarantee that they would be usable because the address assignments    in the ISP's private addressing realm might conflict with unrelated    address assignments in the clients' private realms.  The clients    therefore have no choice but to use their global public addresses as    seen by S for their P2P communication, and rely on NAT X to provide    loopback translation. 3.3.4. Consistent port bindings    The hole punching technique has one main caveat: it works only if    both NATs are cone NATs (or non-NAT firewalls), which maintain a    consistent port binding between a given (private IP, private UDP)    pair and a (public IP, public UDP) pair for as long as that UDP port    is in use.  Assigning a new public port for each new session, as a    symmetric NAT does, makes it impossible for a UDP application to    reuse an already-established translation for communication with    different external destinations.  Since cone NATs are the most    widespread, the UDP hole punching technique is fairly broadly    applicable; nevertheless a substantial fraction of deployed NATs are    symmetric and do not support the technique. 3.4. UDP port number prediction    A variant of the UDP hole punching technique discussed above exists    that allows peer-to-peer UDP sessions to be created in the presence    of some symmetric NATs.  This method is sometimes called the "N+1"    technique [BIDIR] and is explored in detail by Takeda [SYM-STUN].    The method works by analyzing the behavior of the NAT and attempting    to predict the public port numbers it will assign to future sessions.    Consider again the situation in which two clients, A and B, each    behind a separate NAT, have each established UDP connections with a    permanently addressable server S:                                   Server S                               18.181.0.31:1234                                      |                                      |               +----------------------+----------------------+               |                                             |        Symmetric NAT A                               Symmetric NAT B Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 15] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    A-S 155.99.25.11:62000                        B-S 138.76.29.7:31000               |                                             |               |                                             |            Client A                                      Client B         10.0.0.1:1234                                 10.1.1.3:1234    NAT A has assigned its own UDP port 62000 to the communication    session between A and S, and NAT B has assigned its port 31000 to the    session between B and S.  By communicating through server S, A and B    learn each other's public IP addresses and port numbers as observed    by S.  Client A now starts sending UDP messages to port 31001 at    address 138.76.29.7 (note the port number increment), and client B    simultaneously starts sending messages to port 62001 at address    155.99.25.11.  If NATs A and B assign port numbers to new sessions    sequentially, and if not much time has passed since the A-S and B-S    sessions were initiated, then a working bi-directional communication    channel between A and B should result.  A's messages to B cause NAT A    to open up a new session, to which NAT A will (hopefully) assign    public port number 62001, because 62001 is next in sequence after the    port number 62000 it previously assigned to the session between A and    S.  Similarly, B's messages to A will cause NAT B to open a new    session, to which it will (hopefully) assign port number 31001.  If    both clients have correctly guessed the port numbers each NAT assigns    to the new sessions, then a bi-directional UDP communication channel    will have been established as shown below.                                   Server S                               18.181.0.31:1234                                      |                                      |               +----------------------+----------------------+               |                                             |             NAT A                                         NAT B    A-S 155.99.25.11:62000                        B-S 138.76.29.7:31000    A-B 155.99.25.11:62001                        B-A 138.76.29.7:31001               |                                             |               |                                             |            Client A                                      Client B         10.0.0.1:1234                                 10.1.1.3:1234    Obviously there are many things that can cause this trick to fail.    If the predicted port number at either NAT already happens to be in    use by an unrelated session, then the NAT will skip over that port    number and the connection attempt will fail.  If either NAT sometimes    or always chooses port numbers non-sequentially, then the trick will    fail.  If a different client behind NAT A (or B respectively) opens    up a new outgoing UDP connection to any external destination after A    (B) establishes its connection with S but before sending its first Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 16] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    message to B (A), then the unrelated client will inadvertently    "steal" the desired port number.  This trick is therefore much less    likely to work when either NAT involved is under load.    Since in practice a P2P application implementing this trick would    still need to work if the NATs are cone NATs, or if one is a cone NAT    and the other is a symmetric NAT, the application would need to    detect beforehand what kind of NAT is involved on either end [STUN]    and modify its behavior accordingly, increasing the complexity of the    algorithm and the general brittleness of the network.  Finally, port    number prediction has no chance of working if either client is behind    two or more levels of NAT and the NAT(s) closest to the client are    symmetric.  For all of these reasons, it is NOT recommended that new    applications implement this trick; it is mentioned here for    historical and informational purposes. 3.5. Simultaneous TCP open    There is a method that can be used in some cases to establish direct    peer-to-peer TCP connections between a pair of nodes that are both    behind existing middleboxes.  Most TCP sessions start with one    endpoint sending a SYN packet, to which the other party responds with    a SYN-ACK packet.  It is possible and legal, however, for two    endpoints to start a TCP session by simultaneously sending each other    SYN packets, to which each party subsequently responds with a    separate ACK.  This procedure is known as a "simultaneous open."    If a middlebox receives a TCP SYN packet from outside the private    network attempting to initiate an incoming TCP connection, the    middlebox will normally reject the connection attempt by either    dropping the SYN packet or sending back a TCP RST (connection reset)    packet.  If, however, the SYN packet arrives with source and    destination addresses and port numbers that correspond to a TCP    session that the middlebox believes is already active, then the    middlebox will allow the packet to pass through.  In particular, if    the middlebox has just recently seen and transmitted an outgoing SYN    packet with the same addresses and port numbers, then it will    consider the session active and allow the incoming SYN through.  If    clients A and B can each correctly predict the public port number    that its respective middlebox will assign the next outgoing TCP    connection, and if each client initiates an outgoing TCP connection    with the other client timed so that each client's outgoing SYN passes    through its local middlebox before either SYN reaches the opposite    middlebox, then a working peer-to-peer TCP connection will result.    Unfortunately, this trick may be even more fragile and timing-    sensitive than the UDP port number prediction trick described above.    First, unless both middleboxes are simple firewalls or implement cone Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 17] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    NAT behavior on their TCP traffic, all the same things can go wrong    with each side's attempt to predict the public port numbers that the    respective NATs will assign to the new sessions.  In addition, if    either client's SYN arrives at the opposite middlebox too quickly,    then the remote middlebox may reject the SYN with a RST packet,    causing the local middlebox in turn to close the new session and make    future SYN retransmission attempts using the same port numbers    futile.  Finally, even though support for simultaneous open is    technically a mandatory part of the TCP specification [TCP], it is    not implemented correctly in some common operating systems.  For this    reason, this trick is likewise mentioned here only for historical    reasons; it is NOT recommended for use by applications.  Applications    that require efficient, direct peer-to-peer communication over    existing NATs should use UDP. 4. Application design guidelines 4.1. What works with P2P middleboxes   Since UDP hole punching is the most efficient existing method of   establishing direct peer-to-peer communication between two nodes   that are both behind NATs, and it works with a wide variety of   existing NATs, it is recommended that applications use this   technique if efficient peer-to-peer communication is required,   but be prepared to fall back on simple relaying when direct   communication cannot be established. 4.2. Peers behind the same NAT   In practice there may be a fairly large number of users who   have not two IP addresses, but three or more. In these cases,   it is hard or impossible to tell which addresses to send to   the registration server. The applications should send all its   addresses, in such a case. 4.3. Peer discovery   Applications sending packets to several addresses to discover   which one is best to use for a given peer may become a   significant source of 'space junk' littering the net, as the   peer may have chosen to use routable addresses improperly as   an internal LAN (e.g. 11.0.1.1, which is assigned to the DOD).   Thus applications should exercise caution when sending the   speculative hello packets. 4.4. TCP P2P applications Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 18] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003   The sockets API, used widely by application developers, is   designed with client-server applications in mind. In its   native form, only a single socket can bind to a TCP or UDP   port. An application is not allowed to have multiple   sockets binding to the same port (TCP or UDP) to initiate   simultaneous sessions with multiple external nodes (or)   use one socket to listen on the port and the other sockets   to initiate outgoing sessions.   The above single-socket-to-port bind restriction is not a   problem however with UDP, because UDP is a datagram based   protocol. UDP P2P application designers could use a single   socket to send as well as receive datagrams from multiple   peers using recvfrom() and sendto() calls.   This is not the case with TCP. With TCP, each incoming and   outgoing connection is to be associated with a separate   socket. Linux sockets API addresses this problem with the   aid of SO_REUSEADDR option. On FreeBSD and NetBSD, this   option does not seem to work; but, changing it to use the   BSD-specific SetReuseAddress call (which Linux doesn't   have and isn't in the Single Unix Standard) seems to work.   Win32 API offers an equivalent SetReuseAddress call.   Using any of the above mentioned options, an application   could use multiple sockets to reuse a TCP port. Say, open   two TCP stream sockets bound to the same port, do a   listen() on one and a connect() from the other. 4.5. Use of midcom protocol   If the applications know the middleboxes they would be   traversing and these middleboxes implement the midcom   protocol, applications could use the midcom protocol to   ease their way through the middleboxes.   For example, P2P applications require that NAT middleboxes   preserve end-point port bindings. If midcom is supported on   the middleboxes, P2P applications can exercise control over   port binding (or address binding) parameters such as lifetime,   maxidletime, and directionality so the applications can both   connect to external peers as well as receive connections from   external peers; and do not need to send periodic keep-alives to   keep the port binding alive. When the application no longer needs   the binding, the application could simply dismantle the binding,   also using the midcom protocol. 5. NAT Design Guidelines Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 19] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    This section discusses considerations in the design of network    address translators, as they affect peer-to-peer applications.    5.1. Deprecate the use of symmetric NATs    Symmetric NATs gained popularity with client-server    applications such as web browsers, which only need to initiate    outgoing connections. However, in the recent times, P2P    applications such as Instant messaging and audio conferencing    have been in wide use. Symmetric NATs do not support the    concept of retaining endpoint identity and are not suitable    for P2P applications. Deprecating symmetric NATs is    recommended to support P2P applications.    A P2P-middlebox must implement Cone NAT behavior for UDP    traffic, allowing applications to establish robust P2P    connectivity using the UDP hole punching technique.      Ideally, a P2P-middlebox should also allow applications to    make P2P connections via both TCP and UDP. 5.2. Add incremental cone-NAT support to symmetric NAT devices    One way for a symmetric NAT device to extend support to P2P    applications would be to divide its assignable port    namespace, reserving a portion of its ports for one-to-one    sessions and a different set of ports for one-to-many    sessions.    Further, a NAT device may be explicitly configured with    applications and hosts that need the P2P feature, so the    NAT device can auto magically assign a P2P port from the    right port block. 5.3. Maintain consistent port bindings for UDP ports    The primary and most important recommendation of this document for    NAT designers is that the NAT maintain a consistent and stable    port binding between a given (internal IP address, internal UDP    port) pair and a corresponding (public IP address, public UDP    port) pair for as long as any active sessions exist using that    port binding. The NAT may filter incoming traffic on a    per-session basis, by examining both the source and destination    IP addresses and port numbers in each packet. When a node on the    private network initiates connection to a new external    destination, using the same source IP address and UDP port as an    existing translated UDP session, the NAT should ensure that the    new UDP session is given the same public IP address and UDP port Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 20] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    numbers as the existing session.    5.3.1. Preserving port numbers    Some NATs, when establishing a new UDP session, attempt to assign the    same public port number as the corresponding private port number, if    that port number happens to be available.  For example, if client A    at address 10.0.0.1 initiates an outgoing UDP session with a datagram    from port number 1234, and the NAT's public port number 1234 happens    to be available, then the NAT uses port number 1234 at the NAT's    public IP address as the translated endpoint address for the session.    This behavior might be beneficial to some legacy UDP applications    that expect to communicate only using specific UDP port numbers, but    it is not recommended that applications depend on this behavior since    it is only possible for a NAT to preserve the port number if at most    one node on the internal network is using that port number.    In addition, a NAT should NOT try to preserve the port number in a    new session if doing so would conflict with the goal of maintaining a    consistent binding between public and private endpoint addresses.    For example, suppose client A at internal port 1234 has established a    session with external server S, and NAT A has assigned public port    62000 to this session because port number 1234 on the NAT was not    available at the time.  Now suppose port number 1234 on the NAT    subsequently becomes available, and while the session between A and S    is still active, client A initiates a new session from its same    internal port (1234) to a different external node B.  In this case,    because a port binding has already been established between client    A's port 1234 and the NAT's public port 62000, this binding should be    maintained and the new session should also use port 62000 as the    public port corresponding to client A's port 1234.  The NAT should    NOT assign public port 1234 to this new session just because port    1234 has become available: that behavior would not be likely to    benefit the application in any way since the application has already    been operating with a translated port number, and it would break any    attempts the application might make to establish peer-to-peer    connections using the UDP hole punching technique. 5.4. Maintaining consistent port bindings for TCP ports    For consistency with the behavior of UDP translation, cone NAT    implementers should also maintain a consistent binding between    private and public (IP address, TCP port number) pairs for TCP    connections, in the same way as described above for UDP.      Maintaining TCP endpoint bindings consistently will increase    the NAT's compatibility with P2P TCP applications that initiate    multiple TCP connections from the same source port. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 21] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003 5.5. Large timeout for P2P applications    We recommend the middlebox implementers to use a minimum timeout    of, say, 5 minutes (300 seconds) for P2P applications, i.e.,    configure the middlebox with this idle-timeout for the port    bindings for the ports set aside for P2P use. Middlebox    implementers are often tempted to use a shorter one, as they are    accustomed to doing currently. But, short timeouts are    problematic. Consider a P2P application that involved 16 peers.    They will flood the network with keepalive packets every 10    seconds to avoid NAT timeouts.  This is so because one might    send them 5 times as often as the middlebox's timeout just in    case the keepalives are dropped in the network. 5.6. Support loopback translation    We strongly recommend that middlebox implementers support    loopback translation, allowing hosts behind a middlebox to    communicate with other hosts behind the same middlebox through    their public, possibly translated endpoints. Support for    loopback translation is particularly important in the case    of large-capacity NATs that are likely to be deployed as the    first level of a multi-level NAT scenario. As described in    section 3.3.3, hosts behind the same first-level NAT but    different second-level NATs have no way to communicate with    each other by UDP hole punching, even if all the middleboxes    preserve endpoint identities, unless the first-level NAT    also supports loopback translation. 6. Security Considerations    Following the recommendations in this document should not    inherently create new security issues, for either the    applications or the middleboxes. Nevertheless, new security    risks may be created if the techniques described here are    not adhered to with sufficient care. This section describes    security risks the applications could inadvertently create    in attempting to support P2P communication across middleboxes,    and implications for the security policies of P2P-friendly    middleboxes. 6.1. IP address aliasing    P2P applications must use appropriate authentication mechanisms    to protect their P2P connections from accidental confusion with    other P2P connections as well as from malicious connection    hijacking or denial-of-service attacks. NAT-friendly P2P Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 22] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    applications effectively must interact with multiple distinct    IP address domains, but are not generally aware of the exact    topology or administrative policies defining these address    domains.  While attempting to establish P2P connections via    UDP hole punching, applications send packets that may frequently    arrive at an entirely different host than the intended one.    For example, many consumer-level NAT devices provide DHCP    services that are configured by default to hand out site-local    IP addresses in a particular address range. Say, a particular    consumer NAT device, by default, hands out IP addresses starting    with 192.168.1.100. Most private home networks using that NAT    device will have a host with that IP address, and many of these    networks will probably have a host at address 192.168.1.101 as    well. If host A at address 192.168.1.101 on one private network    attempts to establish a connection by UDP hole punching with    host B at 192.168.1.100 on a different private network, then as    part of this process host A will send discovery packets to    address 192.168.1.100 on its local network, and host B will send    discovery packets to address 192.168.1.101 on its network. Clearly,    these discovery packets will not reach the intended machine since    the two hosts are on different private networks, but they are very    likely to reach SOME machine on these respective networks at the    standard UDP port numbers used by this application, potentially    causing confusion. especially if the application is also running    on those other machines and does not properly authenticate its    messages.    This risk due to aliasing is therefore present even without a    malicious attacker. If one endpoint, say host A, is actually    malicious, then without proper authentication the attacker could    cause host B to connect and interact in unintended ways with    another host on its private network having the same IP address    as the attacker's (purported) private address. Since the two    endpoint hosts A and B presumably discovered each other through    a public server S, and neither S nor B has any means to verify    A's reported private address, all P2P applications must assume    that any IP address they find to be suspect until they successfully    establish authenticated two-way communication. 6.2. Denial-of-service attacks    P2P applications and the public servers that support them must    protect themselves against denial-of-service attacks, and ensure    that they cannot be used by an attacker to mount denial-of-service    attacks against other targets. To protect themselves, P2P    applications and servers must avoid taking any action requiring    significant local processing or storage resources until Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 23] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    authenticated two-way communication is established. To avoid being    used as a tool for denial-of-service attacks, P2P applications and    servers must minimize the amount and rate of traffic they send to    any newly-discovered IP address until after authenticated two-way    communication is established with the intended target.    For example, P2P applications that register with a public rendezvous    server can claim to have any private IP address, or perhaps multiple    IP addresses. A well-connected host or group of hosts that can    collectively attract a substantial volume of P2P connection attempts    (e.g., by offering to serve popular content) could mount a    denial-of-service attack on a target host C simply by including C's    IP address in their own list of IP addresses they register with the    rendezvous server. There is no way the rendezvous server can verify    the IP addresses, since they could well be legitimate private    network addresses useful to other hosts for establishing    network-local communication. The P2P application protocol must    therefore be designed to size- and rate-limit traffic to unverified    IP addresses in order to avoid the potential damage such a    concentration effect could cause. 6.3. Man-in-the-middle attacks    Any network device on the path between a P2P client and a    rendezvous server can mount a variety of man-in-the-middle    attacks by pretending to be a NAT.  For example, suppose    host A attempts to register with rendezvous server S, but a    network-snooping attacker is able to observe this registration    request. The attacker could then flood server S with requests    that are identical to the client's original request except with    a modified source IP address, such as the IP address of the    attacker itself.  If the attacker can convince the server to    register the client using the attacker's IP address, then the    attacker can make itself an active component on the path of all    future traffic from the server AND other P2P hosts to the    original client, even if the attacker was originally only able    to snoop the path from the client to the server.    The client cannot protect itself from this attack by    authenticating its source IP address to the rendezvous server,    because in order to be NAT-friendly the application MUST allow    intervening NATs to change the source address silently.  This    appears to be an inherent security weakness of the NAT paradigm.    The only defense against such an attack is for the client to    authenticate and potentially encrypt the actual content of its    communication using appropriate higher-level identities, so that    the interposed attacker is not able to take advantage of its    position.  Even if all application-level communication is Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 24] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003    authenticated and encrypted, however, this attack could still be    used as a traffic analysis tool for observing who the client is    communicating with. 6.4. Impact on middlebox security    Designing middleboxes to preserve endpoint identities does not    weaken the security provided by the middlebox. For example, a    Port-Restricted Cone NAT is inherently no more "promiscuous"    than a Symmetric NAT in its policies for allowing either    incoming or outgoing traffic to pass through the middlebox.    As long as outgoing UDP sessions are enabled and the middlebox    maintains consistent binding between internal and external    UDP ports, the middlebox will filter out any incoming UDP packets    that do not match the active sessions initiated from within the    enclave. Filtering incoming traffic aggressively while maintaining    consistent port bindings thus allows a middlebox to be    "peer-to-peer friendly" without compromising the principle of    rejecting unsolicited incoming traffic.    Maintaining consistent port binding could arguably increase the    predictability of traffic emerging from the middlebox, by revealing    the relationships between different UDP sessions and hence about    the behavior of applications running within the enclave. This    predictability could conceivably be useful to an attacker in    exploiting other network or application level vulnerabilities.    If the security requirements of a particular deployment scenario    are so critical that such subtle information channels are of    concern, however, then the middlebox almost certainly should not be    configured to allow unrestricted outgoing UDP traffic in the    first place. Such a middlebox should only allow communication    originating from specific applications at specific ports, or    via tightly-controlled application-level gateways.  In this    situation there is no hope of generic, transparent peer-to-peer    connectivity across the middlebox (or transparent client/server    connectivity for that matter); the middlebox must either    implement appropriate application-specific behavior or disallow    communication entirely. 7. Acknowledgments    The authors wish to thank Henrik, Dave, and Christian Huitema    for their valuable feedback. 8. References 8.1. Normative references Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 25] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003 [BIDIR]    Peer-to-Peer Working Group, NAT/Firewall Working Committee,            "Bidirectional Peer-to-Peer Communication with Interposing            Firewalls and NATs", August 2001.            http://www.peer-to-peerwg.org/tech/nat/ [KEGEL]    Dan Kegel, "NAT and Peer-to-Peer Networking", July 1999.            http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~dank/peer-nat.html [MIDCOM]   P. Srisuresh, J. Kuthan, J. Rosenberg, A. Molitor, and            A. Rayhan, "Middlebox communication architecture and            framework", RFC 3303, August 2002. [NAT-APPL] D. Senie, "Network Address Translator (NAT)-Friendly            Application Design Guidelines", RFC 3235, January 2002. [NAT-PROT] M. Holdrege and P. Srisuresh, "Protocol Complications            with the IP Network Address Translator", RFC 3027,            January 2001. [NAT-PT]   G. Tsirtsis and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address            Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766,            February 2000. [NAT-TERM] P. Srisuresh and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address            Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC            2663, August 1999. [NAT-TRAD] P. Srisuresh and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network            Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,            January 2001. [STUN]     J. Rosenberg, J. Weinberger, C. Huitema, and R. Mahy,            "STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)            Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,            March 2003. 8.2. Informational references [ICE]      J. Rosenberg, "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE):            A Methodology for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal            for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",            draft-rosenberg-sipping-ice-00 (Work In Progress),            February 2003. [RSIP]     M. Borella, J. Lo, D. Grabelsky, and G. Montenegro,            "Realm Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001. [SOCKS]    M. Leech, M. Ganis, Y. Lee, R. Kuris, D. Koblas, and Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 26] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003            L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996. [SYM-STUN] Y. Takeda, "Symmetric NAT Traversal using STUN",            draft-takeda-symmetric-nat-traversal-00.txt (Work In            Progress), June 2003. [TCP]      "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793, September 1981. [TEREDO]   C. Huitema, "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through NATs",            draft-ietf-ngtrans-shipworm-08.txt (Work In Progress),            September 2002. [TURN]     J. Rosenberg, J. Weinberger, R. Mahy, and C. Huitema,            "Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN)",            draft-rosenberg-midcom-turn-01 (Work In Progress),            March 2003. [UPNP]     UPnP Forum, "Internet Gateway Device (IGD) Standardized            Device Control Protocol V 1.0", November 2001.            http://www.upnp.org/standardizeddcps/igd.asp 9. Author's Address    Bryan Ford    Laboratory for Computer Science    Massachusetts Institute of Technology    77 Massachusetts Ave.    Cambridge, MA 02139    Phone: (617) 253-5261    E-mail: baford@mit.edu    Web: http://www.brynosaurus.com/    Pyda Srisuresh    Caymas Systems, Inc.    11799-A North McDowell Blvd.    Petaluma, CA 94954    Phone: (707) 283-5063    E-mail: srisuresh@yahoo.com    Dan Kegel    Kegel.com    901 S. Sycamore Ave.    Los Angeles, CA 90036    Phone: 323 931-6717        Email: dank@kegel.com    Web: http://www.kegel.com/ Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 27] Internet-Draft     P2P applications across middleboxes      October 2003 Full Copyright Statement    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.    This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to    others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it    or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published    and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any    kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are    included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this    document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing    the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other    Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of    developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for    copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be    followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than    English.    The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be    revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.    This document and the information contained herein is provided on an    "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING    TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING    BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION    HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF    MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Ford, Srisuresh & Kegel                                        [Page 28]

本文参与腾讯云自媒体分享计划,欢迎正在阅读的你也加入,一起分享。

发表于

我来说两句

0 条评论
登录 后参与评论

相关文章

来自专栏bboysoul

linux下的彩蛋和各种有趣的命令

循环输出 for ((i=1;i<=30;i++));do linux_logo -f -L $i;sleep 0.1;done

1634
来自专栏技术小黑屋

Auth Password Cannot Be Read From a File

I am facing this problem which leaves the error message

1842
来自专栏Golang语言社区

文件上传下载

package main import ( "fmt" "html/template" "log" "net/http" ...

45518
来自专栏xingoo, 一个梦想做发明家的程序员

ping 实现设计---ICMP

发送ICMP报文时,必须程序自己计算校验和,将它填入ICMP头部对应的域中。 校验和的计算方法:   将数据以字为单位累加到一个双字中,如果数据长度为奇数,最后...

2157
来自专栏生信技能树

linux 命令中英文对照,收集

听说markdown排版得用浏览器打开,点击最下面的阅读原文也可以! Is Linux CLI case-sensitive? The answer is, y...

3966
来自专栏运维

DELL R710 服务器内存排错

man dmidecode 可以得到详细的介绍和使用方法,dmidecode - DMI table decoder,DMI (Desktop Manageme...

4112
来自专栏月色的自留地

macOS的OpenCL高性能计算

1968
来自专栏安恒网络空间安全讲武堂

“骇极杯”全国大学生网络安全邀请赛WriteUp

这里看到需要伪造ip 在头中伪造ip只有几种情况:xff xci clientip remoteaddr

3803
来自专栏xingoo, 一个梦想做发明家的程序员

WSAEventSelect模型 ---应用实例,重写TCP服务器实例

// WSAEvent.cpp : 定义控制台应用程序的入口点。 // #include "stdafx.h" #include <winsock2.h> #...

2009
来自专栏技术沉淀

给Rails应用添加Disqus

1629

扫码关注云+社区

领取腾讯云代金券