我们介绍了修改后的 Schelling 游戏类，其中有不同类型的代理占用位置图的节点;同一类型的代理是朋友，不同类型的代理是敌人。每个代理都有一定的战略，会跳到图形的空节点，意欲扩大她的公用区域，其中关于公用区域的定义为：它的邻居节点中友军节点（即为同类型节点）的比例，其中邻居节点的范围包含该节点本身。这与关于Schelling游戏的相关文献形成鲜明对比，后者通常假定一个代理在计算其公用区域大小时，是被排除在她的邻居节点之外的。我们的模型使公共区域函数能够获取的公共区域：使代理更可能存在于很多友军身边而不是仅仅在几个友军身边的情况，这个漏洞在以前的工作中经常被部分忽略。我们通过限制一般图表和有趣的特殊情况的无政府状态和稳定性价格，对此类修改后的谢林游戏中产生的均衡有效性以及无效性方面进行彻底分析。我们的大部分成果是严谨的，并利用平衡的结构以及复杂的体系。
原文标题：Modified Schelling Games
原文：We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is strategic and jumps to empty nodes of the graph aiming to maximize her utility, defined as the ratio of her friends in her neighborhood over the neighborhood size including herself. This is in contrast to the related literature on Schelling games which typically assumes that an agent is excluded from her neighborhood whilst computing its size. Our model enables the utility function to capture likely cases where agents would rather be around a lot of friends instead of just a few, an aspect that was partially ignored in previous work. We provide a thorough analysis of the (in)efficiency of equilibria that arise in such modified Schelling games, by bounding the price of anarchy and price of stability for both general graphs and interesting special cases. Most of our results are tight and exploit the structure of equilibria as well as sophisticated constructions.
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