根据空间公共物品博弈的标准协议，合作者不仅投入到自己的博弈中，也投入到相邻伙伴组织的博弈中。在这项研究中，我们放松了这个假设，让合作者决定更喜欢哪个相邻的组，而不是一致地支持它们。特别是，我们假设他们选择了他们最成功的邻居，并且将外部投资完全集中在相关的集团中。我们表明，这种对动态规则的非常简单的改变会导致一个令人惊讶的积极的进化结果——即使在恶劣的环境中，合作伙伴也会占上风，因为在游戏中，协同因子的值很小。合作者战略成功背后的微观机制可以用一种有偏见地影响竞争策略传播的阻塞机制来解释。通过使用不同的交互拓扑，我们的结果保持不变。结果显示，集中个人的努力来达到更高的全球福祉可能是有益的。

原文题目：Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner

原文：According to the standard protocol of spatial public goods game, a cooperator player invests not only into his own game but also into the games organized by neighboring partners. In this work, we relax this assumption by allowing cooperators to decide which neighboring group to prefer instead of supporting them uniformly. In particular, we assume that they select their most successful neighbor and focus external investments exclusively into the related group. We show that this very simple alteration of the dynamical rule results in a surprisingly positive evolutionary outcome -- cooperators prevail even in harsh environment represented by small values of the synergy factor in the game. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported success of the cooperator strategy can be explained by a blocking mechanism which affects the propagations of competing strategies in a biased way. Our results, which remain intact by using different interaction topologies, reveal that it could be beneficial to concentrate individual efforts to reach a higher global wellbeing.

原文作者：Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

原文地址：https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08560