blocks|key|2192830|text|“不能这样做。”|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|2192831|运行任意(不受信任的)脚本和保持安全是矛盾的。您应该使用自定义内核、jails、vms等。|2192832|你可以看看http://codepad.org/about是如何做到这一点的，它有很多工作要做。|offset|length|2192833|entityMap|0|LINK|mutability|MUTABLE|url|http://codepad.org/about^0|0|0|5|O|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|P|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|C|5|6|7|Q|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|D|3|E|5|6|7|R|8|@]|9|@$F|S|G|T|1|U]]|A|$]]|$1|H|3|-4|5|6|7|V|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|I|$J|$5|K|L|M|A|$N|O]]]]

"Can't be done."

Running arbitrary (untrusted) scripts and staying safe is a contradiction. You should go as far as using custom kernels, jails, vms, the like.

You can look at how <a href="http://codepad.org/about" rel="noreferrer">http://codepad.org/about</a> does it, it's a lot of work.

blocks|key|3156865|text|我不知道在早期的版本中，在Python3中，你可以通过types.FunctionType创建可以访问自定义作用域的函数。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|3156866|def+f():
++return+__builtins__

f()+#+this+will+work+because+it+has+access+to+__builtins__
scope+=+{}
sandboxed+=+FunctionType(f.__code__,scope)
sandboxed()++#+will+throw+NameError,+builtins+is+not+defined|code-block|syntax|javascript|3156867|返回的函数只能访问作用域字典中提供的任何内容。我想知道是否仍然有黑客围绕这一点。|3156868|entityMap^0|0|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|K|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|C|5|D|7|L|8|@]|9|@]|A|$E|F]]|$1|G|3|H|5|6|7|M|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|I|3|-4|5|6|7|N|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|J|$]]

I dont know in earlier versions, in Python 3 you can create functions with access to a custom scope through types.FunctionType.

<pre><code>def f():
 return __builtins__

f() # this will work because it has access to __builtins__
scope = {}
sandboxed = FunctionType(f.__code__,scope)
sandboxed() # will throw NameError, builtins is not defined
</code></pre>

the returned function has only access to whatever you supplied in the scope dictionary. I wonder if still there are hacks around this.

blocks|key|5268151|text|现在有相当多的web服务器运行着不可信的python代码：|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|5268152|5268153|http://codepad.org/+(可能是最臭名昭著的pastebin+(以前是Javabat，更改名称以反映python+addition)|unordered-list-item|offset|length|5268154|http://appengine.google.com/+)(在谷歌的infrastructure)|5268155|http://www.spoj.pl/上托管Python代码臭名昭著的Sphere评委编码挑战|5268156|5268157|你可能想看看他们是如何解决问题的。|5268158|或者，您可能想看一种不同的方法：|5268159|5268160|http://pyjs.org/+-+pyjamas+python-+to+-javascript编译器(运行客户端，将安全问题转移到客户端)|5268161|5268162|entityMap|0|LINK|mutability|MUTABLE|url|http://codepad.org/|1|http://appengine.google.com/|2|http://www.spoj.pl/|3|http://pyjs.org/^0|0|0|0|J|0|0|0|S|1|0|0|J|2|0|0|0|0|0|0|G|3|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|18|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|-4|5|6|7|19|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|C|3|D|5|E|7|1A|8|@]|9|@$F|1B|G|1C|1|1D]]|A|$]]|$1|H|3|I|5|E|7|1E|8|@]|9|@$F|1F|G|1G|1|1H]]|A|$]]|$1|J|3|K|5|E|7|1I|8|@]|9|@$F|1J|G|1K|1|1L]]|A|$]]|$1|L|3|-4|5|6|7|1M|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|M|3|N|5|6|7|1N|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|O|3|P|5|6|7|1O|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|Q|3|-4|5|6|7|1P|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|R|3|S|5|E|7|1Q|8|@]|9|@$F|1R|G|1S|1|1T]]|A|$]]|$1|T|3|-4|5|6|7|1U|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|U|3|-4|5|6|7|1V|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|V|$W|$5|X|Y|Z|A|$10|11]]|12|$5|X|Y|Z|A|$10|13]]|14|$5|X|Y|Z|A|$10|15]]|16|$5|X|Y|Z|A|$10|17]]]]

there are quite a lot of web-server running untrusted python codes nowadays:

<ul>
<li><a href="http://codepad.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://codepad.org/</a> (probably the most notorious pastebin for python codes)</li>
<li><a href="http://codingbat.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://codingbat.com/</a> (previously Javabat, name change to reflect Python addition)</li>
<li><a href="http://appengine.google.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://appengine.google.com/</a> (host python code on Google's infrastructure)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.spoj.pl/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://www.spoj.pl/</a> the infamous Sphere Online Judge coding challenge</li>
</ul>

you may want to look at how they approached their problems.

or you may want to look at a different approach:

<ul>
<li><a href="http://pyjs.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://pyjs.org/</a> - pyjamas - python-to-javascript compiler (running client-side, switch the security problem to their side)</li>
</ul>

blocks|key|5268103|text|“做不到”太苛刻了。JavaScript引擎存在于您的web浏览器中，它们安全地接受和运行不受信任的脚本。总是有漏洞的可能性，但在正确的引擎操作中，它们是无害的。甚至还有“慢脚本”检查，以防止无限循环拒绝服务攻击您的浏览器，使这些小警告对话框。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|5268104|Google+App+Engine运行Python+VM的沙箱版本，它有效地删除了让您访问底层系统的所有顽皮本机代码。要以安全的方式自己完成此操作，需要一些Python+VM专业知识。|5268105|为了保持理智，您可以从删除所有内建项开始，并在您确认用户不接触底层系统后，将其列入白名单。|5268106|这感觉像是有人已经做过了，但我不知道有任何现有的项目可以做到这一点。:-/|5268107|entityMap^0|0|0|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|J|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|C|5|6|7|K|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|D|3|E|5|6|7|L|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|F|3|G|5|6|7|M|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|H|3|-4|5|6|7|N|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|I|$]]

"Can't be done," is too harsh. JavaScript engines live in your web browser and they accept and run untrusted scripts safely. There's always the possibility of exploits, but in correct engine operation they are innocuous. There are even "slow script" checks that prevent infinite loops from denial-of-service attacking your browser, making those little alert dialogs.

Google App Engine runs a sandboxed version of the Python VM which effectively removes all the naughty native bits that let you get at the underlying system. To do this yourself in a safe manner would take some Python VM expertise.

For sanity, you could start off by removing all builtins and whitelisting the ones you want to allow users once you certify they don't touch the underlying system.

It feels like something somebody must have already done, but I don't know of any existing project that does it. :-/

blocks|key|286088|text|我认为这样做的方法是在普通Python+shell中运行这些脚本，但要在虚拟机上运行。我可能有偏见，因为我目前的“工作”是与VM打交道(大学很棒！)。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|286089|可以在几秒钟内创建并启动一个新的VM实例。如果你保留了一些，并且只更换那些坏掉的，你就有了很好的服务，绝对的安全性，几乎不需要任何努力。|286090|但有一件事:现在几乎所有的web主机都是虚拟机，它们不支持另一个虚拟机。为此，您需要一台真正的物理服务器。|286091|entityMap^0|0|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|H|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|C|5|6|7|I|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|D|3|E|5|6|7|J|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|F|3|-4|5|6|7|K|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|G|$]]

I think the way to do this is to run those scripts in normal Python shell, but on a virtual machine. I might be biased, because my "job" is currently to play around with VMs (universities are great!).

A new VM instance can be created and started in seconds. If you keep a few around and replace only those that get broken, you have good service, absolute security and almost no effort.

But there is one thing: Virtually all web hosts today are virtual machines and they don't support another virtual machine inside. You need a real, physical server to do this.

blocks|key|3156747|text|据我所知，Brett+Cannon对此有一个试探性的设计，但还没有开发出来。因此，除非您希望投入大量精力来实现这一点，否则目前还没有公开可用的解决方案。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|3156748|布雷特的博客是：http://sayspy.blogspot.com/如果你想阅读它，我找不到他关于新安全设计的讨论的直接链接。我不记得我有没有读过他的博客，或者他是不是当面提到了这件事，对不起。|offset|length|3156749|过去有一些受限的执行能力，但它们被放弃了，因为它们就是不起作用。|3156750|这不是不可能做到的，但Python现在还不能做到这一点。这是人们喜欢的东西，但从我所看到的来看，这并不是一个高优先级的事情。|3156751|entityMap|0|LINK|mutability|MUTABLE|url|http://sayspy.blogspot.com/^0|0|8|R|0|0|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|R|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|C|5|6|7|S|8|@]|9|@$D|T|E|U|1|V]]|A|$]]|$1|F|3|G|5|6|7|W|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|H|3|I|5|6|7|X|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|J|3|-4|5|6|7|Y|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|K|$L|$5|M|N|O|A|$P|Q]]]]

Brett Cannon has a tentative design for doing this, last I knew, but it has not been developed. So unless you're looking to put a LOT of effort into making this happen, there currently isn't a solution publicly available.

Brett's blog is at: <a href="http://sayspy.blogspot.com/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">http://sayspy.blogspot.com/</a> if you want to try to read up on it, I couldn't find a direct link to his discussions about the new security design. I can't recall if I read his blog talking about it, or if it was in person where he mentioned it, sorry.

There used to be some restricted execution abilities, but they were dropped because they just didn't work.

It's not impossible to do, but it's not something that Python is able to do right now. It's something people would like, but it's not really a high priority from what I've seen.

blocks|key|3156753|text|trypython.org+(BSD+licensed+source+here)在IronPython中(通过Silverlight/Moonlight)做了这样一个面向浏览器的安全版本。您可以将这些脚本的无头版本组合在一起，以便在服务器上使用--但您绝对可以让用户在彼此之间分发脚本，或者您可以分发这些脚本，以便在插件环境中执行。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|offset|length|data|3156754|entityMap|0|LINK|mutability|MUTABLE|url|http://www.trypython.org/|1|http://code.google.com/p/trypython/^0|0|D|0|F|O|1|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|N|8|@]|9|@$A|O|B|P|1|Q]|$A|R|B|S|1|T]]|C|$]]|$1|D|3|-4|5|6|7|U|8|@]|9|@]|C|$]]]|E|$F|$5|G|H|I|C|$J|K]]|L|$5|G|H|I|C|$J|M]]]]

<a href="http://www.trypython.org/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">trypython.org</a> (<a href="http://code.google.com/p/trypython/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">BSD licensed source here</a>) does a safe browser oriented version of such a sanbox in IronPython (via Silverlight/Moonlight). You may be able to mash together a headless version of this for use on a server -- but you could definitely let users distribute scripts between each other, or you could distribute these scripts to be executed within the plugin environment.

blocks|key|2192957|text|如果你使用Linux，也许seccomp是解决方案，甚至mode+2更好。有了这些，您可以创建一个新进程，该进程将使任何syscall失败，并且只能读取已经存在的文件描述符。|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|offset|length|data|2192958|也许使用命名空间和cgroup也会有所帮助，这可以通过ctype来实现。|2192959|entityMap|0|LINK|mutability|MUTABLE|url|http://lwn.net/Articles/332974/|1|http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/^0|D|7|0|S|6|1|0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|P|8|@]|9|@$A|Q|B|R|1|S]|$A|T|B|U|1|V]]|C|$]]|$1|D|3|E|5|6|7|W|8|@]|9|@]|C|$]]|$1|F|3|-4|5|6|7|X|8|@]|9|@]|C|$]]]|G|$H|$5|I|J|K|C|$L|M]]|N|$5|I|J|K|C|$L|O]]]]

If you use Linux maybe <a href="http://lwn.net/Articles/332974/" rel="nofollow">seccomp</a> is the solution, even the <a href="http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/" rel="nofollow">mode 2</a> is nicer. With those you can create a new process that will fail any syscall and can only read already existing file descriptors. 

Maybe using also namespaces and cgroup would help, this can be done with ctypes.

blocks|key|286143|text|您可以尝试Ideone+API+-它允许Python+2和Python+3|type|unstyled|depth|inlineStyleRanges|entityRanges|data|286144|entityMap^0|0^^$0|@$1|2|3|4|5|6|7|D|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]|$1|B|3|-4|5|6|7|E|8|@]|9|@]|A|$]]]|C|$]]

You could try Ideone API - it allows Python 2 and Python 3

I'd like to make a website where people could upload their Python scripts. Of course I'd like to execute those scripts. Those scripts should do some interesting work. The problem is that people could upload scripts that could harm my server and I'd like to prevent that. What is the option to run arbitrary scripts without harming my system - actually without seeing my system at all? Thank you

Python, safe, sandbox

翻译质量差，导致语言生硬或混乱。

没有提供实际的解决方法或示例。

解答不清晰，无法理解或解决问题。

页面排版不美观，阅读体验差。

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我想做一个网站，人们可以上传他们的Python脚本。当然，我想执行这些脚本。这些脚本应该会做一些有趣的工作。问题是，人们可能会上传脚本，这可能会损害我的服务器，我想阻止这种情况。在不损害我的系统的情况下运行任意脚本的选项是什么--实际上根本看不到我的系统？谢谢

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