调用外部合约时,执行流可能会“回流”到调用方,导致逻辑在状态更新前被重复执行。
function withdraw(uint _amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount, "Not enough");
(bool ok, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: _amount}(""); // 外部调用
require(ok);
balances[msg.sender] -= _amount; // ❌ 状态更新过晚
}function withdraw(uint _amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount, "Not enough");
balances[msg.sender] -= _amount; // ✅ 先修改状态
(bool ok, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: _amount}("");
require(ok, "Transfer failed");
}或者使用 OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard:
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
contract SafeVault is ReentrancyGuard {
mapping(address => uint) public balances;
function withdraw(uint _amount) external nonReentrant {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount);
balances[msg.sender] -= _amount;
payable(msg.sender).transfer(_amount);
}
}区块链交易在进入区块之前会进入 内存池(Mempool),攻击者可以观察并提前插队:
hash(secret),等到揭示阶段再公布真实数据。在之前的课程中,我们通过 Check-Effects-Interactions 的方式来避免冲入攻击。现在,我们使用 ReentrancyGuard 来修复合约。
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
contract SafeVictim is ReentrancyGuard {
mapping(address => uint) public balances;
function deposit() external payable {
balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
}
function withdraw(uint _amount) external nonReentrant {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount);
balances[msg.sender] -= _amount;
(bool ok,) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: _amount}("");
require(ok);
}
}// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/SafeVictim.sol";
import "../src/Attacker.sol";
contract SafeVictimTest is Test {
SafeVictim safe;
Attacker attacker;
function setUp() public {
safe = new SafeVictim();
attacker = new Attacker(address(safe));
vm.deal(address(this), 10 ether);
}
function testSafeWithdraw() public {
// 攻击者尝试攻击
vm.deal(address(attacker), 1 ether);
vm.expectRevert(); // 攻击应该失败
attacker.attack{value: 1 ether}();
}
receive() external payable {}
}执行测试:
➜ tutorial git:(main) ✗ forge test --match-path test/SafeVictim.t.sol -vvv
[⠊] Compiling...
[⠒] Compiling 3 files with Solc 0.8.30
[⠑] Solc 0.8.30 finished in 513.05ms
Compiler run successful!
Ran 1 test for test/SafeVictim.t.sol:SafeVictimTest
[PASS] testSafeWithdraw() (gas: 49870)
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 5.86ms (1.28ms CPU time)
Ran 1 test suite in 165.82ms (5.86ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)在写合约时,建议遵循以下安全清单:
Victim.sol,让它变为安全版本(提示:CEI 原则)。核心理念:
在区块链世界,攻击者永远在等着你写错一行代码。
下一课(第 19 课):我们将探讨 编译器特性与低级漏洞(Slot 冲突、ABI 混淆、Selfdestruct) —— 这些“看不见的陷阱”比逻辑错误更难察觉,却可能致命。