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文献汇总

[1] The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

影子银行的兴起：来自资本监管的证据

[2] Mortgage Securitization and Shadow Bank Lending

住房抵押贷款证券化与影子银行贷款

[3] Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending

了解竞争对手：来自中小企业贷款的证据

[4] Marketplace Lending, Information Aggregation, and Liquidity

市场借贷、信息聚合和流动性

[5] Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns

共同基金作为风险投资家？独角兽的证据

[6] Public Market Players in the Private World: Implications for the Going-Public Process

私人世界中的公共市场参与者：对上市进程的影响

[7] Household Inequality, Entrepreneurial Dynamism, and Corporate Financing

家庭不平等、创业活力与企业融资

[8] Cyclical Fluctuations, Financial Shocks, and the Entry of Fast-Growing Entrepreneurial Startups

周期性波动、金融冲击和快速成长的创业公司的进入

[9] Minimum Wages and Consumer Credit: Effects on Access and Borrowing

最低工资和消费信贷：对获取和借贷的影响

[10] Side Effects of Nudging: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in the Credit Card Market

轻推的副作用：来自信用卡市场随机干预的证据

[11] Impulsive Consumption and Financial Well-Being: Evidence from an Increase in the Availability of Alcohol

冲动性消费与经济健康：来自酒精供应增加的证据

[12] Housing, Mortgages, and Self-Control

住房、抵押贷款和自我控制

[1] The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

标题:影子银行的兴起：来自资本监管的证据

作者:Rustom M Irani, Rajkamal Iyer, Ralf R Meisenzahl, José-Luis Peydró

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2181/5901059; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa106

Abstract : We investigate the connections between bank capital regulation and the prevalence of lightly regulated nonbanks (shadow banks) in the U.S. corporate loan market. For identification, we exploit a supervisory credit register of syndicated loans, loan-time fixed effects, and shocks to capital requirements arising from surprise features of the U.S. implementation of Basel III. We find that less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention, particularly among loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce, and nonbanks step in. This reallocation is associated with important adverse effects during the 2008 crisis: loans funded by nonbanks with fragile liabilities are less likely to be rolled over and experience greater price volatility.

Abstract:我们调查了银行资本监管与美国企业贷款市场上监管宽松的非银行（影子银行）的普遍性之间的联系。为了进行识别，我们利用了银团贷款的监管信用记录、贷款时间固定效应以及美国实施巴塞尔协议III的意外特征对资本要求的冲击。我们发现资本化程度较低的银行会减少贷款留存，尤其是在资本要求更高的贷款中，以及在资本稀缺、非银行介入的时候。这种重新分配与2008年危机期间的重大不利影响有关：由负债脆弱的非银行提供资金的贷款不太可能展期，价格波动更大。

[2] Mortgage Securitization and Shadow Bank Lending

标题:住房抵押贷款证券化与影子银行贷款

作者:Pedro Gete, Michael Reher

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2236/5881650; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa088

Abstract : We show how securitization affects the size of the nonbank lending sector through a novel price-based channel. We identify the channel using a regulatory spillover shock to the cross-section of mortgage-backed security prices: the U.S. liquidity coverage ratio. The shock increases secondary market prices for FHA-insured loans by granting them favorable regulatory status once securitized. Higher prices lower nonbanks’ funding costs, prompting them to loosen lending standards and originate more FHA-insured loans. This channel accounts for 22% of nonbanks’ growth in overall mortgage market share over 2013–2015. While the shock creates risks for financial stability, homeownership also increases.

Abstract:我们展示了证券化如何通过一种新的基于价格的渠道影响非银行贷款部门的规模。我们使用监管溢出冲击来确定抵押贷款支持证券价格的横截面：美国流动性覆盖率。这种冲击提高了联邦住房管理局保险贷款的二级市场价格，使其在证券化后获得有利的监管地位。更高的价格降低了非银行的融资成本，促使它们放宽贷款标准，发放更多由联邦住房管理局担保的贷款。该渠道占2013-2015年非银行抵押贷款市场总份额增长的22%。虽然这场冲击给金融稳定带来了风险，但住房拥有量也在增加。

[3] Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending

标题:了解竞争对手：来自中小企业贷款的证据

作者:Olivier Darmouni, Andrew Sutherland

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2275/5903748; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa109

Abstract : We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less. Thus, contract terms are shaped not only by borrower or lender fundamentals but also by the interaction between information availability and competition.

Abstract:我们研究了中小企业（SME）贷款机构对竞争对手合同决策信息的反应。为了将这种学习从贷款人对未观察到的基本面冲击的共同反应中分离出来，我们利用贷款人交错进入信息共享平台。一旦进入，贷款人调整他们的合同条款向别人提供。这种反应是通过市场份额的分配来调节的：份额较高或在集中市场运作的贷款人反应较少。因此，合同条款不仅取决于借款人或贷款人的基本情况，而且还取决于信息可用性和竞争之间的相互作用。

[4] Marketplace Lending, Information Aggregation, and Liquidity

标题:市场借贷、信息聚合和流动性

作者:Julian Franks, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, Oren Sussman

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2318/5905498; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa101

Abstract : Lending marketplaces aimed at directly connecting retail lenders and borrowers retreat from auctions and, instead, set prices and allocate credit on their own, despite evidence that retail investors possess valuable soft and nonstandard information. We investigate this puzzle by analyzing a unique data set of 7,455 auctions and 34 million bids from a leading British peer-to-business platform. We find that the platform was vulnerable to liquidity shocks, resulting in sizable deviations from information efficiency. Deviations increased over time because of a growing role played by noncrowd players, particularly large investors and algorithms.

Abstract:尽管有证据表明，散户投资者拥有有价值的软信息和非标准信息，但旨在将散户贷款人和借款人直接联系起来的贷款市场却放弃了拍卖，而是自行定价和分配信贷。我们通过分析一个独特的数据集（7455次拍卖和3400万次竞拍）来研究这个难题，这个数据集来自一个领先的英国对等商业平台。我们发现，该平台容易受到流动性冲击的影响，从而导致与信息效率的较大偏差。偏差随着时间的推移而增加，因为非拥挤的参与者，特别是大型投资者和算法扮演着越来越重要的角色。

[5] Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns

标题:共同基金作为风险投资家？独角兽的证据

作者:Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner, Yao Zeng

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2362/5905499; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa100

Abstract : “Founder-friendly” venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.

Abstract:过去十年中，“对创始人友好”的风险融资和非传统风险投资者都蓬勃发展。利用详细的合约数据，我们研究了开放式共同基金对私人风险投资公司的投资。我们假设早期风险投资者和流动性受限的后期风险投资者之间的冲突影响了影响企业家和投资者的经典代理问题。我们发现，资金更稳定的共同基金更有可能投资于私人公司，而共同基金参与的融资回合具有更强的赎回能力、更强的IPO相关权利和更少的董事会代表性。这些发现与我们的概念框架是一致的。

[6] Public Market Players in the Private World: Implications for the Going-Public Process

标题:私人世界中的公共市场参与者：对上市进程的影响

作者:Shiyang Huang, Yifei Mao, Cong (Roman) Wang, Dexin Zhou

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2411/5891671; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa092

Abstract : We investigate the effect of pre-IPO investments by public market institutional investors (institutions) on the exit of venture capitalists (VCs). Results indicate that institutions’ pre-IPO investments reduce IPO underpricing by mitigating VCs’ reliance on all-star analysts to boost market liquidity. We conclude that institutions facilitate VC exits in the secondary market. Supporting this view, our analysis reveals that the presence of institutions allows VCs to exit with a reduced price impact in the secondary market. Consistent with the ease of exit, VCs offer fewer shares at the IPO and are more likely to invest in institutionally backed startups.

Abstract:本文研究了上市前机构投资者的投资对风险投资家退出的影响。结果表明，机构的IPO前投资通过减轻风投对全明星分析师的依赖来提高市场流动性，从而降低IPO抑价。我们的结论是，机构有助于风险投资退出二级市场。支持这一观点，我们的分析表明，机构的存在使得风投能够在二级市场以较低的价格影响退出。与退出的便利性相一致，风投在IPO时提供的股票较少，更有可能投资于机构支持的初创企业。

[7] Household Inequality, Entrepreneurial Dynamism, and Corporate Financing

标题:家庭不平等、创业活力与企业融资

作者:Fabio Braggion, Mintra Dwarkasing, Steven Ongena

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2448/5897425; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa097

Abstract : Economic theories posit conflicting hypotheses on how wealth inequality affects entrepre-neurial dynamism. We investigate the impact of wealth inequality on business dynamics by constructing local measures of household wealth inequality based on financial rents, home equity, and 1880 farmland. We then identify the effect of wealth inequality on entrepre-neurship by instrumenting it with land distribution under the 1862 Homestead Act. Wealth inequality decreases firm entry and exit, and the proportion of high-tech businesses across metropolitan statistical areas. Wealth inequality also lowers the supply of public goods, such as education. Growth in income per capita consequently lags.

Abstract:经济理论对财富不平等如何影响中枢动力提出了相互矛盾的假设。我们通过构建基于财政租金、房屋净值和1880块农田的家庭财富不平等的局部测度，研究了财富不平等对商业动态的影响。然后，我们根据1862年《宅地法》将财富不平等与土地分配相结合，确定财富不平等对创业的影响。财富不平等减少了企业的进入和退出，降低了大都市统计区高科技企业的比例。财富不平等也降低了公共产品的供给，如教育。因此，人均收入增长滞后。

[8] Cyclical Fluctuations, Financial Shocks, and the Entry of Fast-Growing Entrepreneurial Startups

标题:周期性波动、金融冲击和快速成长的创业公司的进入

作者:Christoph Albert, Andrea Caggese

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2508/5913396; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa112

Abstract : We analyze a multiyear, multicountry entrepreneurship survey with more than one million observations to identify startups with low and high growth potential. We confirm the validity of these ex ante measures with ex post firm-level information on employment growth. We find that negative aggregate financial shocks reduce all startup types, but their effect is significantly stronger for startups with high growth potential, especially when GDP growth is low. Our results uncover a new composition of entry channel that significantly reduces employment growth and is potentially important for explaining slow recoveries after financial crises.

Abstract:我们分析了一项历时多年、多国的创业调查，通过100多万次观察，找出了具有低增长和高增长潜力的初创企业。我们用企业层面就业增长的事后信息来验证这些事前措施的有效性。我们发现，负的总金融冲击降低了所有类型的初创企业，但对于具有高增长潜力的初创企业，尤其是在GDP增长率较低的情况下，其影响更为显著。我们的研究结果揭示了一种新的进入渠道构成，它显著降低了就业增长，对解释金融危机后经济复苏缓慢具有潜在的重要意义。

[9] Minimum Wages and Consumer Credit: Effects on Access and Borrowing

标题:最低工资和消费信贷：对获取和借贷的影响

作者:Lisa J Dettling, Joanne W Hsu

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2549/5903747; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa091

Abstract : This paper examines how minimum wages affect lender and borrower interactions with consumer credit markets. We find that higher state minimum wages increase the supply of unsecured credit, reduce payday loan usage, decrease delinquency, and increase credit scores. Overall, minimum wages reduce borrowing costs and have positive spillover effects on disposable income and liquidity. A back-of-the-envelope of the cost savings indicates that higher minimum wages increase disposable income by 1.3% more than implied by estimates of the direct effect on earnings.

Abstract:本文探讨最低工资如何影响借贷双方与消费信贷市场的互动。我们发现，较高的州最低工资增加了无担保信贷的供应，减少了发薪日贷款的使用，减少了拖欠，并增加了信用评分。总体而言，最低工资降低了借贷成本，并对可支配收入和流动性产生了积极的溢出效应。成本节约的封底表明，提高最低工资使可支配收入增加了1.3%，高于对收入直接影响的估计。

[10] Side Effects of Nudging: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in the Credit Card Market

标题:轻推的副作用：来自信用卡市场随机干预的证据

作者:Paolina C Medina

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2580/5903746; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa108

Abstract : This paper studies the direct and indirect effects of nudging, by means of a field experiment with a financial management platform in Brazil. Reminders for upcoming credit card payments reduced credit card late-payment fees by 14%, but increased overdraft fees in checking accounts by 9%. The unintended effect is concentrated in users with a history of overdraft use. These users experienced a net increase of 5% in total fees, while the rest experienced savings of 15%. The results provide clear insights for nudge design: like any policy action, nudges can have side effects, and one size may not fit all.

Abstract:本文通过在巴西的一个财务管理平台上进行实地实验，研究了轻推的直接和间接影响。提醒即将到来的信用卡付款减少了14%的信用卡滞纳金，但增加了9%的支票帐户透支费。非预期的影响集中在有透支使用历史的用户身上。这些用户的总费用净增了5%，其余用户则节省了15%。研究结果为微移设计提供了清晰的见解：与任何政策行动一样，微移可能会产生副作用，而且一种尺寸可能不适合所有尺寸。

[11] Impulsive Consumption and Financial Well-Being: Evidence from an Increase in the Availability of Alcohol

标题:冲动性消费与经济健康：来自酒精供应增加的证据

作者:Itzhak Ben-David, Marieke Bos

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2608/5893490; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa094

Abstract : The increased availability of alcohol may harm individuals who have present-focused preferences and consume more than initially planned. Using a nationwide experiment in Sweden, we study the credit behavior of low-income households around the expansion of liquor stores’ operating hours on Saturdays. Consistent with store closures serving as commitment devices, the policy led to higher credit demand, more default, increased dependence on welfare, and higher crime on Saturdays. The effects are concentrated on the young population due to higher alcohol consumption combined with tight liquidity constraints. The policy’s impact on indebtedness is estimated at 4.5 times the expenditure on alcohol.

Abstract:酒精供应量的增加可能会伤害那些有着集中偏好的人，他们的消费量超过了最初的计划。通过在瑞典进行的一项全国性实验，我们研究了酒类商店周六营业时间扩大前后低收入家庭的信贷行为。与作为承诺手段的商店关闭相一致，这项政策导致了更高的信贷需求、更多的违约、对福利的依赖性增加以及周六更高的犯罪率。这些影响主要集中在年轻人身上，因为他们的酒精消费量较高，同时流动性紧张。该政策对负债的影响估计是酒精支出的4.5倍。

[12] Housing, Mortgages, and Self-Control

标题:住房、抵押贷款和自我控制

作者:Kathrin Schlafmann

链接:https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/34/5/2648/5906532; https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa096

Abstract : Using a quantitative theoretical framework this paper analyzes how problems of self-control influence housing and mortgage decisions. The results show that people with stronger problems of self-control are less likely to become homeowners, even though houses serve as commitment for saving. The paper then investigates the welfare effects of regulating mortgage products if people differ in their degree of self-control. Holding house prices fixed, higher down payment requirements and restrictions on refinancing turn out to be beneficial to people with sufficiently strong problems of self-control, even though these policies restrict access to the commitment device.

Abstract:本文运用定量的理论框架分析了自我控制问题对住房和抵押贷款决策的影响。研究结果显示，自我控制能力较强的人成为房主的可能性较小，尽管房子是储蓄的承诺。然后，本文研究了当人们自我控制程度不同时，监管抵押贷款产品的福利效应。保持房价不变、提高首付要求和限制再融资，结果证明对那些自我控制问题足够严重的人是有利的，尽管这些政策限制了人们使用承诺工具。